

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

SECURITY IN NORTHERN EUROPE
AFTER THE COLD WAR

By

Svein A. Besserudhagen

Lieutenant Colonel, Norwegian Air Force

Advisor: Colonel Frank Belote

A PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

14 APRIL 1995

DISCLAIMER

This paper represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

Summary

The end of the Cold War came with dramatic changes in Europe. NATO is searching for its future in a Europe threatened by instability and break down of government control and law and order in Russia. Security in Northern Europe is strongly influenced by the events in Europe as a whole. However, the region is not in focus as the discussions of NATO's future and other questions of Europe's security issues are conducted in the capitals of the major European powers and in Washington.

Northern Europe is bordering directly on Russia and may be adversely and directly affected by a reasserted Russia or a Russia falling apart from within. There are large conventional military forces remaining in the region capable of supporting Russian adventures if an extremist government should gain power. Russia's big power status rests on her nuclear weapons. The naval component of the nuclear forces on the Kola Peninsula has gained a proportionally greater significance to Russia than during the Cold War.

Threats other than military also play a prominent role. Pollution and accidents involving radioactive materials constitute hazards that may affect the whole of Europe and beyond. Organized crime, massive refugee problems and migration control are other challenges facing the countries bordering on Russia.

The countries of Northern Europe all seek multilateral cooperation rather than bilateral arrangements in order to avoid pressure and intimidation. There is a common recognition that regional cooperation must include Russia. This raises

the issue that there has to be trust in the Russian government that it will live up to its international commitments and at the same time is able to maintain internal control.

The many initiatives and organizations in Europe have a limited capability to answer the security requirements of Northern Europe. The Organization of Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) are essentially Cold War instruments that are severely limited in their ability to fulfill the requirements of Northern Europe. The European Union (EU) and its military branch the Western European Union (WEU), have very little to offer in way of military security to Northern Europe. All military instruments have to be “borrowed” from NATO or the US. It cannot replace NATO as the departure of the US would remove unique capabilities that would be virtually irreplaceable. A Europe without the US would also be a place open for renewed rivalry between the major powers, a rivalry that has resulted in many devastating wars throughout history.

The way ahead will be difficult and slow. Based on the situation in the region, the challenges present, and the security requirements of the Northern European countries, I recommend the following:

- * The Nordic countries with membership both in NATO and the EU, have to actively work to build the awareness of the region's situation and what challenges are facing the countries in their struggle for security and prosperity.

- * The countries of the region have to be realistic and take charge of their own situation. The Nordic countries should take the initiative to establish a cooperative body with Poland and the Baltic republics that is tasked to develop specific vehicles for political, economic, and military cooperation.
- * The Nordic countries should take the lead in the cooperation efforts with Russia in the Barents region. Building awareness of the region is necessary both in NATO and the EU. Economic and political support have to be solicited from the EU as well as NATO. NATO support should emphasize US and Canadian participation.
- * Norway should use her influence in an effort to maintain NATO's support in the region. NATO is the organization best suited to guarantee the security of the region in spite of the multitude of players on the European scene. Norway should strive for continued US leadership in NATO and commitments in the region.
- * All Northern European countries should actively participate in the various organizations and initiatives like the OSCE, NACC, and PFP. Small, non-threatening countries are more in favorable positions to promote confidence and cooperation between other countries.
- * Expansion of NATO is not urgent, but it should be supported as part of a gradual and evolving process.

SECURITY IN NORTHERN EUROPE AFTER THE COLD WAR

I — INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Introduction

The end of the Cold War came with dramatic changes in Europe. Since 1989 with Germany reunited, the Soviet Union gone, and the Warsaw Pact (WP) disbanded, the old military threats along the Inner-German border are gone, and all other significant threats against NATO appear to have disappeared. Built to prevent westward Soviet expansion, NATO suddenly found itself free from a threat of attack from virtually any external power. However, the results of the Cold War's end are posing serious risks for the future. Fierce fighting in the former Yugoslavia, rising nationalism, instability throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are worrisome developments. Some European countries are actively promoting purely European organizations like the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU), indirectly challenging the Trans-Atlantic relationship. In addition there are institutions and initiatives like the Organization on Security and Cooperation (OSCE),¹ the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and Partnership for Peace (PFP) trying to fit into this unclear picture. The question of expansion of NATO or the EU to include former WP countries further adds to the confusion. There are undoubtedly real and legitimate Russian concerns over developments that may increasingly isolate Russia.

¹ The December 5-6, 1994 summit decided to change the name from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The focus of this paper will be on the situation in Northern Europe. Main emphasis will be placed on the area covering Poland, the Baltic Republics, European Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. However, there is no clear boundary dividing these countries from the rest of Europe, making it necessary to refer to developments within Europe as a whole.

Northern Europe is not a homogeneous entity. There are former WP members, former Soviet republics, NATO members, EU members, and countries that have pursued neutrality in the pull between East and West during the Cold War.² Reorganization of NATO's command structure may signal that NATO is placing less focus and importance to the Northern Region than earlier. Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) in Norway closed July 1, 1994. A new headquarters at the same level was established in the UK from the same date. This leaves Norway with only one headquarters at the Principal Subordinate Command (PSC) level versus one Major Subordinate Command (MSC) and two PSCs earlier. There is a reduction in forces earmarked for Norway. Typically Canada can no longer afford a force dedicated to North Norway. Questions of other nations withdrawing are sensitive issues, and other countries may follow Canada's example. Norway decided not to join the EU in a November 1994 referendum and is consequently not a part of several European processes. There are many challenges to the Atlantic ties, and there is a fear that US involvement in Europe is going to decline further. Defense Secretary Perry recently reiterated the US commitment of maintaining 100.000 troops in Europe. One should keep in mind that with the US forces stationed at home, the interaction with the overseas allies is weakened. He put an important qualifier

²Due to the multitude and mixed membership status, a table showing which country is member of which organization influencing this region, can be found in a separate annex at the end of this paper.

on this as he stressed the necessity of public support both at home and in Europe.³

My thesis is that the post Cold War security of Northern Europe depends on regional cooperation that includes Russia. The Nordic countries are in a unique situation to bridge the gap between East and West that may indeed be beneficial to closer integration throughout Europe. Political, economic, and military backing in the region are important roles for NATO and the EU/WEU. Further more, I will show that the United States still is an integral part of European security.

After this introduction and overview, I will first develop the problem and discuss the threats to the region. Secondly, I will examine regional goals and requirements for security and stability. Thirdly, I will examine possible directions for security in the Northern European region and what their limitations are. Based on this discussion, I will conclude the discussion and recommend a solution.

II — CHALLENGES OF NORTHERN EUROPE, THREATS AGAINST THE REGION

The New Northern European Strategic Landscape

The end of the Cold War has wiped away the strategic distinction between Europe's center and periphery. The focus has shifted from the Cold War

³Steve Komarow. Perry: NATO must look southward, USA Today, February 6, 1995, p8.

Inner-German Border to the areas of potential instability further east, namely the Baltic states, Eastern Europe, Russia, and the former Soviet republics. North Africa, the Middle East and Southwest Asia are also areas of concern.⁴ However I will focus on Northern Europe in this paper.

The power vacuum in Eastern Europe following the Soviet collapse has left behind a region of potential instability. It is worth remembering the historical facts of ever changing borders and ethnic conflicts in the East and Central European countries. There are many unanswered questions of nationalism and national minorities hidden in these countries.⁵ Lack of economic progress and runaway inflation further threatens the region's stability.

It is also noteworthy that these countries have limited ability to defend themselves against external threats. The feeble democracies of eastern Europe look westward for protection. Russia remains a significant worry. National instabilities coupled with real life figures like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, make it very dangerous to rule out a Russia that will assert itself again.⁶ Extremist views held by Zhirinovsky may indeed describe a mood within Russia that with the appropriate nurturing may trigger far reaching events. The Russian intervention in Chechnya is an example of this. The question of who is in charge comes to the forefront as president Yeltsin publicly "ordered" a stop to air attacks on Grozny apparently to no avail. The situation is unclear, but indicates

⁴Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee. Building a New NATO. Foreign Affairs, September/October 1993, pp29-30. During an international security conference in Germany February 5, 1995, US Defense Secretary Perry urged Western military leaders to focus on this threat from extremists from the Balkans, North Africa and Southwest Asia.

⁵Laslo Valki. A Future Security Architecture for Europe? European Security, Vol 2, No 4 (winter 1993), pp506-507.

⁶Some examples of Zhirinovsky's chilling statements can be found in Time Magazine, July 11, 1994 and November 21, 1994.

that some parts of the military may have achieved a certain degree of autonomy. This brings the question of a possible successor to President Yeltsin closer.⁷

Another very disturbing episode occurred on January 25, 1995 as Russian military sources reported that a ballistic missile fired from North Norway had been intercepted and shot down. According to press reports, the Russian military and political leadership were ready to initiate emergency measures designed for nuclear war.⁸ Some sources claim that this could describe a very jittery Russian air defense system that misread the situation despite normal advance warnings.⁹ Other reports indicate that this was a false report for internal consumption, generated by the military to boost its image against the backdrop of failure in Chechnya.¹⁰ According to the same report President Yeltsin praised the Army's response during the incident.

There should be concerns about Russia and her ways of thinking. Expansion of NATO is a very sensitive issue. Russia's defense minister Pavel Grachev stated that Russia still considers all of the former Soviet Union to be part of its sphere of influence, during his visit to Denmark in September of 1994.¹¹ President Boris Yeltsin made similar and perhaps stronger statements to the same effect

⁷Claudia Rosett. Russia Still Poses Potential Danger, U.S. Envoy Says, the Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1995, p19.

⁸Reported in the Norwegian newspapers Aftenposten and Arbeiderbladet 27 January 1995. The Norwegian wire service, NTB, carried the same story 27 January 1995.

⁹Sonni Efron. "Missile Attack" on Russia Was Just a Science Probe. Los Angeles Times, Jan 26, 1995.

¹⁰Russians Lay Blame for Missile. Reported by Associated Press.

¹¹Stephen Kinzer. With Eye on Russia, Lithuania Courts NATO. The New York Times, Sep 25, 1994, p10.

at the United Nations on September 26, 1994,¹² and in Budapest on December 5, 1994.¹³ The issue of NATO membership for former Soviet republics and WP countries has reached a high degree of urgency on their part.¹⁴ This is also the case for Germany that is actively supporting the initiatives to expand the EU and NATO eastward. The United States is more cautious and seeks to include Russia in the desire for promoting democracy, economic prosperity, and security.¹⁵ Some critics argue quite harshly that the Clinton administration's motive for promoting Partnership for Peace is to give an appearance of support to these countries, while the real reason is a fear of provoking the Russians and setting off the destructive forces represented by, among others, Zhirinovsky.¹⁶ This is a significant difference from the German position and is indicative of some of the fundamental differences that need to be worked out.

When we turn our attention to Nordic countries, including Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, the strategic picture is different. This is a very peaceful and prosperous corner of the world. Some of the concerns about Russia remain the same as further south, but the history is quite different. The ties to North America are reflections of the different positions during the Cold War. However, it is worth remembering that all of these countries have been and are oriented to the West. Finland was forced to accommodate Soviet interests and skillfully carried out this balancing act. The need to protect themselves from a reasserted

¹²John M. Goshko. Yeltsin Claims Russian Sphere of Influence. The Washington Post, September 27, 1994, p10.

¹³President Yeltsin made strong accusations against the US and NATO of "sowing the seeds of mistrust" during the December 5-6, 1994 CSCE summit in Budapest .

¹⁴NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol 39, No 2, 1994.

¹⁵Michael Shields, Reuters. Perry wants Russia consulted, informed as NATO moves east, the Washington Times, February 6, 1995, p11.

¹⁶Josef Joffe. Putting Russia first. US News & World Report, January 17, 1994, p52.

Russia is not felt as urgently as in Eastern Europe. This allows other factors to be more focused. Great concerns exist in Scandinavia concerning environmental issues like nuclear waste and unsafe nuclear power generating plants. These factors are felt to be dangerous and potentially more devastating to the societies than the current military threat.

There is a common set of goals among the Scandinavian countries. The focus is on human values. The welfare societies are quite typical for the thinking in these countries. The tax burdens are heavy, and serious challenges are appearing as the population ages and the cost of welfare benefits continue to rise dramatically. One of the arguments for not joining the EU was the fear of the societies turning “cold” and materialistic. Whether the expansion of the EU will reduce the common goals and values in society remain to be seen. Some curtailment of welfare spending has to occur regardless.

Another typical face of this region is the strong belief in international order and morality. There is a very strong belief in the UN and other international organizations. At the same time there is great scepticism regarding intervention by major powers around the world, even if it also is to their benefit. Part of the underlying reason is the fact that Russia may intervene in small nations’ affairs, legitimized through Western intervention in other parts of the world. Nuclear weapons and NATO’s nuclear strategy have been a contested issue. Nuclear weapons are still to a large extent regionally viewed as immoral and a crime against the human race if ever used regardless of the size or reason for employment. The protection and benefits from living under the US nuclear umbrella have not been recognized and not been discussed much in fear of provoking a strong move against NATO. There is significant idealism in these countries - some will say innocence and naiveté. This has to be reckoned with as

it has the potential for the governments not facing up to difficult defense challenges. One may further argue that public support for a strong defense is questionable as public spending has to be curtailed.

Primary Concerns in Europe Today

Based on the overview above of the new situation in Europe, the primary concerns can be summarized to be:

- * To reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation and spread of nuclear material.
- * Continued support of the former WP members in Central Europe.
- * Continued support of the feeble democracies in Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union.
- * To avoid a breakdown of Russian law and order.
- * To develop the means to prevent and deal with ethnic conflicts in Europe.
- * Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions under the charter of the UN or the OSCE throughout the world.
- * Prevention of massive flow of refugees and migration control.

As these concerns and challenges stretch well beyond Europe, this is the interest of not only Europe, but the world as a whole. The US is the leading economic, political and military power of the world. It has declared a vested interest in the developments in Europe, and in particular Russia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. This interest encompasses more than the questions of nuclear weapons and proliferation. The US has reassured its European allies about this several times: ¹⁷

¹⁷Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Strengthening the Atlantic Alliance Through a Partnership for Peace, remarks at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, NATO Headquarters, December 2, 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, December 13, 1993, p857.

“(. . .) the strong and unbreakable link between the United States and Europe. The President recognizes that American leadership remains indispensable. And he is determined that the United States will continue to provide that leadership because it is profoundly in the interest of both the United States and Europe to do so.”

The Significance of Northern Europe

Despite the disappearance of the direct military confrontation along the Inner-German border other security concerns remain. Russia casts her shadow over more than just her former republics and allies in the WP. The desire to maintain a buffer zone between Russia and NATO was expressed strongly by Mr Sergei Karaganov, a member of president Yeltsin's Presidential Council, at a security policy conference in Berlin on January 23, 1995. He stressed that Poland in particular should be included in such a zone. ¹⁸

Northern Europe's situation tends not to be in focus in the current debate over European security solutions for the future. The Norwegian Minister of Defense wrote in an article what the fundamental basis for concern in the region is: ¹⁹

“The combination of significant military forces and political instability and unpredictability is the fundamental basis for the concern of Russia's Nordic neighbors.”

¹⁸Judy Dempsey. NATO warned over eastward expansion. London Financial Times, January 24, 1995.

¹⁹Mr Georgian Kosmo, Norwegian Minister of Defense. Security in Northern Europe After the End of the Cold War. An address printed in the Viking Review at AFNORTH, February 9, 1994.

Northern Europe with its common borders on Russia, may be directly affected by a reasserted Russia. Chaos following a break down of law and order or government control of Russia and her military create great uncertainty. Security solutions in Northern Europe must provide security and stability in face of these direct threats. These are difficult challenges as they must be dealt with directly rather than the indirect effects that are being felt from the tragedy in Bosnia.

The governments of Northern Europe face a serious dilemma when it comes to dealing with Russia. Cooperation and development of trust and confidence between the countries of the region demand there is a Russian government in charge that will be able and willing to maintain its international commitments. Simultaneously, the government must maintain internal control.

Threats Against Northern Europe

Unfortunately the skies are not cloud free, and we cannot ignore the large conventional forces remaining in the area. If a great internal crisis should develop in Russia, the potential exists that this may spill over into the Northern European area as this region borders directly on Russia. The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, physically isolated from the rest of Russia, is worrisome to the Baltic republics and Poland. There are relatively large Russian populations in the Baltic republics themselves. Finland is in an exposed situation as well as the areas far north close to the base complexes in the Kola peninsula. These potential threats should not be exaggerated or used as an argument against expanded cooperation with Russia. However, if an extremist government should gain power in Russia, these possibilities should not be overlooked.

In addition to the general concerns listed above it is necessary to focus on certain unique aspects of the situation in the north - essentially covering the northern parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland, Northwestern Russia, the Barents Sea, and the North Norwegian Sea.

The first issue impacting on this area is the changed strategic situation for Russia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic submarines, their bases, and operational areas have a proportionally greater value to Russia today than they had during the Cold War. Ukraine and Kazakhstan are no longer nuclear powers. Russia's only remaining foundation to call itself a super power is through maintaining a strong nuclear force. The Arctic is the only area from which Russia with relative certainty can maintain strategic nuclear forces at sea. Russia has legitimate concerns over the safety of these bases just as the Soviet Union had. The Norwegian government recognized this through a set of self-imposed restrictions concerning allied activities.²⁰ It was successful in maintaining a relatively low level of tension in the area. A low Western military profile in the Barents Sea has been seen by Norway as the most important contribution to maintaining low tensions in the area.

²⁰The self imposed restrictions prohibit allied aircraft or naval units to use Norwegian bases if their operations brought the east of 24 degrees east longitude (east of North Cape). Allied ground forces are not allowed to operate in the county of Finnmark. There is an ongoing evaluation of the continued usefulness of these restrictions.

Threats other than military

As the direct military threats are reduced and our insights into Russia have improved, new and worrisome dangers are apparent. Dumping of nuclear material - even whole reactor systems - in the Barents and Kara Seas pose serious economic threats to the northern areas. Any rumors of or actual contamination of fish from this area would automatically wipe out this industry that is the foundation for populating large parts of the coastal areas in the north.

Accidents with material stored on board ships in Kola harbors and accidents at any of a number of unsafe nuclear power generating plants may threaten the entire societies of the region. Effects from the Chernobyl accident in 1986 are still felt in parts of Scandinavia. Any significant nuclear fallout would destroy grazing lands for sheep, reindeer, dairy cattle and also pollute fresh water fishing. A major nuclear accident may indeed threaten large parts of Europe and beyond.

The Russian mafia can develop into a serious threat against law and order, and ultimately against government control. Organized crime is not a significant problem in Russia's neighboring countries yet. However, there are great fears, real and imagined, about this as drugs and a variety of petty crimes strain customs and law enforcement in rural, traditionally peaceful, villages in the border areas with Russia.

Masses of refugees flowing across the borders from Russia is another possibility, but it is probably not the most likely scenario. Russians are used to harsh living

conditions and the western societies would not necessarily be an easy place to settle - even on a temporary basis. Unless severe disorder forced them out of their country, they would likely stay put.

III — REGIONAL GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY

Regional Goals and Points of View

All nations of the region have expressed the necessity of regional cooperation to deal with their security requirements. Regional cooperation needs to go well beyond the stability and confidence building necessary to control military threats in the region. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr Björn Tore Godal, underscored some of the goals this way: ²¹

“We wish to promote durable cooperation and stability through measures to counteract and reduce military tension, to reduce or eliminate environmental threats, and to narrow the gap between the standard of living in the Nordic countries and in Russia. We need to create a multilateral framework for regional cooperation that will be attractive to states both within and outside the region, to

²¹Mr Björn Tore Godal, Norwegian Foreign Minister. Regional Cooperation in the European High North. NATO Review, June 1994, pp9-11.

promote stability and establish a link between the Barents region and the broader European process of restructuring.”

In the following I will address some of the specific desires of the countries of the Northern European region. The common thread found in the region is a desire for multilateralism for small nations as opposed to bilateral arrangements with a large power to prevent domination and intimidation. There are different approaches to this and I will outline some important viewpoints from the region:

a. Poland²²

The Polish foreign policy contains a strategic goal of membership in and integration in what is considered the two most important structures of European and Trans-Atlantic security, namely the European Union and NATO. Poland intends to carry its own weight and contribute to upholding the common values and goals of the organizations. Evidence is presented suggesting that Poland is a stable society based on democracy, that the relations with its neighbors are normalized and friendly, and that significant contributions are made to improve the prosperity and stability of Europe. In Poland's view of herself she is: *“(. . .) a democratic, economically growing and internationally active country, that will be a valuable partner for the NATO states.”*

²²Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, H. E. Andrzej Olechowski. From Partnership to Membership, NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol 39, No 2, 1994. In this special issue many of the non-NATO PFP members give their governments' views security issues in general and on the expectations they have in the PFP process in particular.

Underlying this discussion, I sense an urgency to become closely integrated with the West without offending Russia. Poland grants NATO a breathing space through the PFP process, but she is impatient. Poland wants to maintain good relations with Russia and other Eastern European countries, but is primarily seeking her security in the West. The issue of being placed in a Russian sphere of interest must be troublesome for the Poles, who are putting their hopes on help from the West.

b. The Baltic Republics

Estonia,²³ Latvia,²⁴ and Lithuania²⁵ have a common goal of being included in international systems that can guarantee their security. A common thread is that in their own judgement they are now democratic nations, ruled by law and promoting respect for human rights. There is recognition that establishing closer links with the West must be a gradual process. However, there will be deep disappointments and little understanding if the PFP process does not progress and a practical cooperation with NATO materialize. There is a sigh of relief throughout the region that the Russian withdrawal went smoothly. An underlying sense of uncertainty remains and there is an urgency to find a security solution firmly anchored in Western

²³Mr Juri Luik, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia. The Right Step in the Right Direction at the Right Time - Estonia's View of PFP, NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol 39, No 2, 1994. See previous note.

²⁴Mr Georgs Andrejvs, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. Search for Security in Common Structures, NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol 39, No 2, 1994. See previous notes.

²⁵Mr Povilas Gylys, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania. Lithuania's Partnership with NATO, NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol 39, No 2, 1994. See previous notes.

Europe and the US. Russia is not directly named as the potential enemy, but there is little doubt that Russia is what is being referred to when they are discussing tension and future threats. This indicates that they are fully aware of their vulnerable and fragile position vis a vis Russia should she again become assertive and crises concerning Kaliningrad, the borders to the east, or the Russian minorities in the Baltic republics occur.

c. The Nordic Countries

Finland's tradition of neutrality and a clever balancing act as it recognized and accommodated Soviet interests during the Cold War, is the basis for the current foreign and security policy. Finland became a member of the EU together with Austria and Sweden, effective January 1, 1995. Finland has made no reservations regarding participation in the EU goals of a closer political and military integration as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty.²⁶

Finland does not seek a new defense solution through its EU membership or participation in the PFP.²⁷ The nation seeks to participate in developing a Europe ruled by democracy, cooperation, and human rights. Stability and cooperative security without creating new divisions in Europe, are the goals of Finland.

²⁶The Maastricht Treaty was subject to a lot of attention during the public debate in Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Norway during the membership negotiations. None of the countries made any reservations and consequently accepted the future goals of the EU.

²⁷Mr Heikki Haavisto, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland. Partnership and Collective Security in Europe - a Finnish View, NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol 39, No 2, 1994.

Sweden has pursued a policy of neutrality supported by a strong military defense and an independent industrial base. Skyrocketing costs of developing new weapon systems cast dark shadows on the future of this industry. In spite of her neutrality, there was never serious doubt about Sweden's leaning to the West in case of armed aggression from the WP. Sweden is convinced that it is necessary to have a broader security definition today than during the Cold War when military security overshadowed everything else. Building and securing democracy, to strengthen the rule of law, to promote human and minority rights, and to create market economies in Eastern Europe are the central elements in an overall security strategy.²⁸ These are the main reasons for Sweden's entry into the EU and participation in various other international organizations. UN support is also an important element in providing stability, crisis prevention, and security. Practical cooperation and joint actions are considered more important than formal membership of alliances.

Norway has especially strong ties to the US through close cooperation in NATO and on a bilateral basis for much of the years following WW II. The goals of the Norwegian security policy are quite similar to the rest of the Nordic countries. NATO was chosen in recognition of the fact that Norway could not achieve the necessary security alone. Norway did not enter the EU on January 1, 1995. The government is searching for workable solutions that will allow a certain degree of participation in what happens in the EU. However, there are signs that this is not of a high priority in Brussels. It is

²⁸Ms Margaretha Af Ugglas, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden. Sweden and the Partnership for Peace, NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol 39, No 2, 1994.

important to understand that the “no” to the EU was not a “no” to Europe and international cooperation. In my view this was an unfortunate occurrence, but the effects on security matters should not be exaggerated as long as NATO and the Trans-Atlantic ties remain intact.

IV — POSSIBLE FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS

Europe’s Multinational Organizations

Before addressing possible ways of solving Northern Europe’s security requirements, it is necessary to conduct a closer examination of Europe’s multinational organizations and bodies. I will describe some of their capabilities and highlight certain limitations that make these bodies unsuited to answer the security requirements of the Northern European countries.

The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The CSCE²⁹ was established in 1975 with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. This was primarily a Cold War tool to create a forum for East-West dialogue and to promote human rights in the Communist Bloc. The CSCE established important standards for human rights, economic cooperation, military

²⁹The December 5-6, 1994 Summit decided to change the name from Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe - OSCE.

openness, and peaceful, democratic change.³⁰ Membership includes all European states, including former Soviet republics, and the United States and Canada.

The OSCE has a part to play in the new Europe. It was instrumental in exporting the ideas of freedom and liberty to the Communist Bloc and should continue as a protector of liberty and human rights. The OSCE laid the groundwork for the regime of inspections of large military exercises. It could be given the broader task of ensuring compliance with CFE and other arms control agreements.³¹

Significant limitations are, however, making it unsuitable to solve Europe's security issues on a broader scale. Decision making is very difficult within the OSCE. The consensus rule that gave each member a de facto veto has been relaxed, but it is still easy to prevent a decision from being made. The participating states form no meaningful geopolitical region. There are arguments that the philosophy of creating the OSCE is no different from the philosophy behind the United Nations. The OSCE is just a *"smaller UN with much less efficient decision-making rules and symbolic decision-making power."*³²

"There is no sense in creating another UN from about one third of its member states, all of which are socially and politically extremely heterogeneous. Second it

³⁰Europe's Multilateral Organizations. Fact Sheet in US Department of State Dispatch, June 29, 1992, Vol 3, No 26, p532.

³¹These issues are discussed in greater detail in the article The Dream of Europax, in The Economist, April 7, 1990, pp14-15.

³²Laszlo Valki. A Future Security Architecture for Europe? European Security, Vol 2, No 4 (Winter 1993), p517. The author deals in great detail in this article with the CSCE's limited power and ability to perform what its staunchest supporters want it to do.

would be highly difficult to divide the power between the Security Council of the UN and that of the CSCE. One of them should have the final word in decision-making, and that should be the Security Council alone."

Laszlo Valki in *European Security*, Vol 2, No 4 (Winter 1993) p520.

The High Commissioner of the OSCE, Mr van der Stoel, made in his analysis before the December 5-6, 1994, Budapest Review Conference and Summit absolutely clear, that the individual states are the keys to success in trying to prevent conflicts in Europe. He stressed that it is necessary to speed up the decision-making process without undermining the political support needed to ensure the implementation of decisions. The way he describes the ongoing process within the OSCE, he himself reveals and underscores the vague nature of the organization through the use of a largely unbinding language.³³

The Budapest Summit achieved very little of substance. The desperate situation on the Balkans was not mentioned by one word in the final communiqué after the meeting. Russian president Yeltsin's Cold War type outburst against an NATO he described as trying to split Europe by inviting Eastern European countries to join the organization overshadowed the meeting.³⁴ These apparent disagreements overshadowed the significant inclusion of Ukraine in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, further reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation.

³³Mr M van der Stoel. Preventing conflict and building peace: a challenge for the CSCE, NATO Review, August 1994, pp7-12.

³⁴Elaine Sciolino. Yeltsin Says NATO Is Trying to Split the Continent Again, Calls Us Domineering, The New York Times, December 6, 1994.

The OSCE cannot answer the security needs of Northern Europe. It can supplement regional cooperation in certain areas, but have no independent role. The organization have no potential for replacing NATO over time as its foundation and membership would preclude any such development.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

The NACC was established in 1991 as a consultative organ between NATO and the states of the former Warsaw Pact, including the new independent republics of the former Soviet Union. Originally the NACC was to include only the Soviet Union and the five non-Soviet WP members. Because of the break up of the Soviet Union, the number of member states grew to more than twenty.³⁵

There are no formal decision-making powers given to NACC. The great diversity between, for example, European nations and Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, probably would have made any process like that virtually impossible. The greatest value in NACC is in its function to create and enhance understanding between military forces that were former enemies and knew very little about the other's way of thinking. This organ differs from the OSCE as it is military officers rather than diplomats that meet. It allows an exchange of ideas in an international setting that was beyond thoughts just a few years ago. NACC plays an important role in enhancing transparency in European security. It should continue the important task to improve understanding and respect between states.

Beyond general confidence building, this body will contribute little specific to security for Northern Europe. It is probable, I think, that NACC gradually will

³⁵ Partnership for PEACE. Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1994, p36.

lose its significance provided the integration process in Europe continues to make progress.

The European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU)

I deal with the EU and WEU together as they are intrinsically linked. All major Western European powers are members of both the EU and the WEU. The distinction between the two may become blurred as political processes in the EU spill over into the WEU. The WEU is slated to gradually become the military arm of the EU. I fully recognize that there is a difference in membership of the two bodies, but I maintain that this is insignificant due to arrangements like associate membership and observer status.

The Maastricht treaty, effective 1 November 1993, contains far reaching statements of goals and intentions with respect to a common European foreign and security policy. NATO's New Strategic Concept endorses this plan of a closer West European security and defense cooperation. The New Strategic Concept reads:³⁶

"The fact that the countries of the European Community³⁷ are working towards the goal of political union, including the development of a European security

³⁶Trevor Taylor. West European Security and defense cooperation: Maastricht and beyond, International Affairs, Vol 70, No I, pp1-2.

³⁷The European Community (EC) changed its name to the European Union (EU) as the Maastricht treaty came into force 1 November 1993.

identity, and the enhancement of the role of the WEU, are important factors for European security. The strengthening of the security dimension in the process of European integration, and the enhancement of the role and responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are positive and mutually reinforcing. The development of the European security identity and defense role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.”

The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is a struggle between desires to create independent and separate European security and defense mechanisms with continued political cooperation with the US on one hand and the desires for greater European security cooperation without weakening the Trans-Atlantic relationship on the other. Typically France seeks more independence from the US whereas Great Britain represents the opposite view.³⁸

The Maastricht treaty lists the objectives of the common foreign and security policy:³⁹

- * To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union.

³⁸Alexander Moens. The European Security and Defense Identity and the Non -Concert of Europe, European Security, Vol 2, No 4 (Winter 1993), p567.

³⁹Trevor Taylor. West European Security and defense cooperation: Maastricht and beyond, International Affairs, Vol 70, No I, pp7-8.

- * To strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways.
- * To preserve peace and strengthen international security, according to the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter.
- * To promote international cooperation.
- * To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

There is nothing extraordinary in these objectives as they probably apply universally. There are no statements of how the EU views the world, what the threats are considered to be, nor what the political and military instruments should be.

The abruptness of the changes in Europe left the continent in a vacuum and despite the stated objectives of cooperation and unity, the progress has been very slow. The ratification of the Maastricht treaty is a good example of how sensitive sovereignty issues are among the states in Europe. Memberships in the EU, the WEU, and NATO are not identical. Member nations of the EU are entitled to become full members of the WEU. If Eastern European countries become EU members and not NATO members, we could face the situation where for instance Poland is a member of the WEU, but not NATO. WEU states which also are NATO members, could then theoretically get involved in affairs excluding the US. This raises the question if in reality NATO membership and WEU membership have to go hand in hand.⁴⁰

⁴⁰Trevor Taylor. West European Security and defense cooperation: Maastricht and beyond, International Affairs, Vol 70, No I, p3.

It is very easy to speak of Western Europe as an entity. Even if the EU expands to cover Austria, Finland and Sweden from 1 January 1995, there are several NATO and non-NATO countries not members of the EU or the WEU.

Sovereignty issues will undoubtedly continue to plague and hamper the unification process. The question of employment of forces - particularly conscript forces - beyond a nation's boundaries will remain a difficult issue. This probably will be even more so if the forces are employed outside areas considered vital for national or alliance security.⁴¹ A changeover to an all professional force may be desirable but difficult to do because of political reasons.

Another significant fact is the very limited capability the European states, whether you count all of Europe or just the EU, have to fight a regional war. It is very unrealistic to think of this without drawing heavily on US support. This describes the reality and it is of course related to the factors above. Even if the population base is larger than that of the US, the economic and industrial base is weaker in Europe. Another part of the explanation is that the Europeans are looking toward the US for leadership.

It can be argued as long as the WEU does not have the necessary command structure, independent intelligence capabilities or airlift, and as long as there were no regional or global situations where the US had no interests, there could not be any independent European Security and Defense Initiative. In other

⁴¹Trevor Taylor. West European Security and defense cooperation: Maastricht and beyond, International Affairs, Vol 70, No I, pp11.

words, there was no reason to object to the changes as they represented little more than words and as such were no threat to NATO. On the other hand others were ready to support the ESDI on the basis of an US desire to get rid of the heavy burden of defending Europe. Others again fear that the whole process discussing the independent ESDI as sufficient to break apart the NATO consensus.⁴²

The common security and defense objectives of the EU have a serious shortfall as long as the WEU has to “borrow” everything from NATO. The WEU lacks a command and force structure. At the January 1994 NATO summit the WEU was authorized to use NATO facilities.⁴³ The challenge to the political mandate of NATO should not become reality until the WEU on its own can take on a NATO task. Western European defense cooperation will be of political significance once the countries develop a capability to employ forces independently of NATO and there is a clear statement of objectives, force capabilities and structures.⁴⁴ The situation with ad hoc arrangements between the WEU and NATO will most likely have to continue at least until the revision of the Maastricht treaty in 1996. The real threat to NATO is a continued competition within the western security system that emphasizes the divisive factors rather than the common interests.⁴⁵

⁴²Alexander Moens. The European Security and Defense Identity and the Non -Concert of Europe, European Security, Vol 2, No 4 (Winter 1993), p575.

⁴³Jahn Rønne. VEU må låne militær ledelse (WEU must borrow military leadership), Forsvarets Forum (The Norwegian Defense Forum), October 5, 1994, pp22-23.

⁴⁴Trevor Taylor. West European Security and defense cooperation: Maastricht and beyond, International Affairs, Vol 70, No I, pp12.

⁴⁵Alexander Moens. The European Security and Defense Identity and the Non -Concert of Europe, European Security, Vol 2, No 4 (Winter 1993), p583.

To the casual observer the EU can be confused with “The United States of Europe”. The political integration will proceed very slowly and probably never reach that point. The WEU may appear as a European NATO, that finally will relieve the US from defending the Europeans from each other. The key to understanding the limitations of the EU/WEU as a NATO replacement lies in the fact that NATO has access to unique capabilities and equipment through the US. If Europe was to proceed without the US, these capabilities would be lost and effective security measures with them. Furthermore the membership issue would be difficult to solve, particularly as rivalry between the major European powers may reappear without the US to check these.

Partnership for Peace (PFP)

During the December 2, 1993 North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting secretary of State Warren Christopher raised the issue on how NATO should respond to the new situation in Europe, especially to the Eastern European countries. With reference to the already established NACC, he outlined the US objectives with the Partnership for Peace or PFP: ⁴⁶

"With the Partnership for Peace, we can now deepen NATO's engagement with the East. We must demonstrate that the West is committed to helping Europe's new democracies address some of their most immediate security problems. At the

⁴⁶Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Strengthening the Atlantic Alliance Through a Partnership for Peace, remarks at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, NATO Headquarters, December 2, 1993, US Department of State Dispatch, December 13, 1993, Vol 4, No 50, p857.

same time, we should signal that we envision an evolutionary expansion of the Alliance. We should make it clear that, as a matter of principles, NATO is open to the admission of new members."

During the same remarks he continued: *"Let me be clear with respect to a very important issue that the Partnership raises. The Partnership is an important step in its own right, but it can also be a key step toward NATO membership."*

The PFP did come into being, and undoubtedly the Eastern European countries, and indeed some former Soviet republics, took this at face value. They are eagerly seeking NATO membership and inclusion in other European institutions. There is a feeling of uneasiness on the part of these countries.

Hungary's minister of Foreign Affairs once said:⁴⁷

"(. . .) Yet, people in Central and Eastern Europe do not feel secure. Whether there is a security vacuum between NATO and Russia or not, the lands between the two are a kind of no-mans-land and can attract "trouble-makers. (. . .)."

The future of this effort may be threatened. Russia surprisingly refused to agree on the pace of the PFP during a meeting in Brussels during the last week of November 1994.⁴⁸ Critics of the PFP process claim that NATO only pretends to want the membership of the Eastern European countries. The truth, they claim,

⁴⁷Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, H. E. Geza Jeszenszky. Our Wish Is To Be Firmly Anchored, NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol 39, No 2, 1994. In this special issue many of the non-NATO PFP members give their governments' views on the expectations they have in the PFP process.

⁴⁸Elaine Sciolino. Yeltsin Says NATO Is Trying to Split the Continent Again, Calls Us Domineering, The New York Times, December 6, 1994.

is that this is a way of “throwing them a bone” without insulting Russia. Some of the fears expressed by members of the PFP may indeed question the reality of being protected by the West.⁴⁹ Russia has apparently achieved a de facto veto over the actions of the US, its European allies and the countries of Eastern Europe.⁵⁰ We have, however, an obligation to recognize Russia’s concerns and not ignore them in the discussions of Europe’s future.

PFP is an interim body that will have its function while NATO determines its future relationships with Russia, Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union. It will serve as a confidence builder, but it is unsuited to answer the security needs of Northern Europe.

NATO's Current Situation

Currently NATO remains an alliance with a long history tying together considerable common experiences and shared values among its member states. An increasing number of countries around the world are subscribing to these values. There are an existing and highly developed political and military structure with a military infrastructure and an advanced C³I system. This fact should not be forgotten as the member nations are searching for the way ahead. Other agendas compete with and gain dominance over the pure defensive and security issues that characterized the Cold War. As NATO is searching for its

⁴⁹Eric Schmitt. U.S. Fight for Uzbeks? No Way, Pentagon Says, the New York Times, February 12, 1995.

⁵⁰Josef Joffe. On Europe. Putting Russia First. US New & World Report, January 17, 1994, p52. Caspar W. Weinberger. A Domestic Foreign Policy, Commentary on Events at Home and Abroad in Forbes Magazine, July 4, 1994, p35.

role in dealing with the changed international situation, it almost appears as if the organization has lost sight of its purpose.

NATO is continuing its way to comply with its July 1990 "Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance."⁵¹ The new security policy reflects a greater reliance on dialogue and cooperation coupled with crisis management. The activities promoting exchange of ideas and cooperation continued step by step and created the NACC, culminating with PFP in January 1994. Crisis management calls for smaller multinational forces that can deal with a variety of situations over a large geographical area. In addition NATO moved away from its strategy of forward defense to a reduced forward presence combined with a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.

Reorganization of NATO's command structure has shifted an important headquarters away from Norway. The headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe was the centerpiece of Allied defense commitments in the Northern Region for several decades. AFNORTH closed July 1, 1994. Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein became part of the Central European Command. The Major Subordinate Command was reestablished in the UK from the same date as Headquarters Allied Forces Northwestern Europe (AFNORTHWEST). The apparent shift in focus away from the Northern Flank is not seen as a dramatic issue in Norway. Changes forced its way forward as the military activities were reduced and the force levels declined. Norwegian authorities are convinced that the new PSC North headquarters in Stavanger will continue the close

⁵¹Europe's Multilateral Organizations. Fact Sheet in US Department of State Dispatch, June 29, 1992, Vol 3, No 26, p531.

relationship and that the changes are not an obstacle to closer links to Continental Europe.⁵²

One cannot ignore the turbulence in the organization, especially the differing opinions between European nations and the US how to handle the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Squabble over difficult issues is nothing new to NATO. However, the Cold War focus is gone. There are fears among the allied nations that this may signal a break down of the unity of NATO in a way never seen before. Jonathan Eyal, director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London said:⁵³

"There is fear everywhere in Europe that we may end up with a NATO that will not be meaningful because of the unreliability of the most important member state."

The entire post war period has been characterized by a very strong, continuous US commitment to Europe. Mr Eyal must, I think, be referring to inconsistencies in US foreign policy which is not new.

The strong and highly developed military and political structure of NATO make it particularly suited to serve as a military and political guarantor for the security of Northern Europe. Security in the Northern European region will depend heavily upon the countries of the region, but an outside guarantee is

⁵²Mr Jörgen Kosmo, Norwegian Minister of Defense. Security in Northern Europe After the End of the Cold War. An address printed in the Viking Review at AFNORTH, February 9, 1994.

⁵³Bruce W. Nelan. Doesn't Anybody Want Peace? Time Magazine, November 28, 1994, pp48 -49.

necessary to offset potential Russian pressures. NATO's strength in providing these guarantees are twofold. First, the strong Trans-Atlantic links will dampen any reemerging European rivalry. Secondly, NATO guarantees to the region will make the security of the Northern European a security issue for the major powers in Western Europe as well as the US and Canada.

The Way Ahead

The way ahead will be difficult and subject to arduous discussions and complicated solutions. Regional cooperation is essential to build an atmosphere that is conducive to the building of democracy, economic prosperity, and peaceful relations in the region. The countries of the far north, encompassing the northern areas of Finland, Sweden, Norway, Northwestern Russia, and the Barents and Kara Seas have started to develop the region. This is done through an extensive cooperation effort between the Nordic countries, Russia, and the European Commission. The cooperation includes areas like economic cooperation, regional infrastructure, science and technology, indigenous peoples, cultural issues, health, and tourism.⁵⁴ With the Cold War no longer dictating the foreign policies of the Nordic countries, a golden opportunity for developing a coordinated Nordic policy toward Russia exists. With Finland and Sweden now members of the EU, and Norway still closely integrated in western security solutions, this cooperation also has a European dimension that will contribute to peace and stability in the area and support the attempts of establishing closer links with Russia.⁵⁵ This cooperation is critical especially seen against

⁵⁴The Nordic countries, Russia and the European Commission signed a declaration on cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic region during a meeting of foreign ministers in Kirkenes, Norway on January 11, 1993.

⁵⁵Mr Björn Tore Godal, Foreign Minister of Norway. Regional Cooperation in the European High North, NATO Review, June 1994, pp-11.

the background of large Russian strategic naval and military forces still remaining in the area, the possibilities of radioactive pollution from military waste and unsafe nuclear power generating plants. Underlying this is economic and other related factors that need strengthening to enable the region to deal with this. Economic issues have been raised in connection with the question of NATO expansion. Expansion will include significant amounts of money in support of the prospective new members. NATO's Secretary General reminded us that: "*NATO is a two-way street. NATO is as much about obligations as it is about benefits.*"⁵⁶ I will argue that any future realigned Europe will imply significant costs that the involved nations cannot escape. Breakdowns of the feeble democracies of Eastern Europe and Russia would undoubtedly deal severe military, economic, and political blows on a totally different scale than a peaceful development toward integration would.

The Baltic Republics and Poland are located at the junction of Northern, Eastern, and Western Europe. The Nordic countries have a good opportunity to include these nations in a close political and economic relationship. Norway has made one contribution in this direction as one fast patrol boat has been given to each of the Baltic states to assist in building a coastal patrol force. An indirect approach to gradually include these nations in direct political, economic, and military cooperation may ease some of the fears of Russia, while at the same time they develop close ties to the West that will help in receiving military guarantees. Inclusion of these countries in a multilateral framework of cooperation aimed at promoting democracy and stability, and establishing a link between the Barents region and the rest of Europe will enhance the support

⁵⁶Craig R. Whitney. Expand NATO? Yes, Say Most Experts, but What Does the Public Think? The New York Times, February 10, 1995, p6.

to the efforts of the PFP and OSCE.⁵⁷ A slow and gradual process of change may increase trust and confidence between the former adversaries, essential in the process of creating a stable democratic government in Russia. One of the aims of the West's approach should be to avoid nurturing extremist views in Russia. However, that cannot be carried to the extreme allowing Russia a veto over other nations' policies.

The question of NATO expansion, reactions against unfortunate internal crises, and a general disappointment of slow progress and setbacks in creating a stable and democratic government in Russia must not be allowed to take control over the situation. There is a danger that domestic issues in the US, with a new Republican Congress that may act in a way reminiscent of the Cold War, may overshadow the serious issues at hand. American security is weakened through cuts in defense spending. The drawdown in itself may be serious, but it does not validate strong rhetorical statements that may endanger the progress that has been made. Bipartisan squabbles in Congress is a natural part of the US political process. However it may result in negative implications around the world.⁵⁸ There are signs that there may be more pressure against Russia, perhaps even direct challenges by a US acceptance of a rapid expansion of NATO eastward in Europe coupled with increased military spending. The restart of a ballistic missile defense may not send the appropriate signals to the world community. Consensus and confidence building will be the most critical elements in the future. The US is signaling a very selective policy in international military engagements other than war at the very time the world looks to the US for leadership. There is no possibility that the US can avoid

⁵⁷Mr Björn Tore Godal, Foreign Minister of Norway. Regional Cooperation in the European High North, NATO Review, June 1994, pp-11.

⁵⁸Cold-War Nostalgia, New York Times, February 3, 1995, p18.

engaging itself more heavily in operations other than war. Significant instabilities are likely to create economic challenges in the future, perhaps to a larger extent than military.

The Nordic countries acting together with the Baltic republics and Poland may be a significant tool in nurturing the process necessary to build and maintain an international understanding of their special security concerns. This does not mean a formal treaty, but one could build one based on, for instance, the Nordic Council and the Council of Baltic Sea States established in 1992. Nordic assistance in building defense forces under civilian political control is a natural measure. A meeting ground is what is needed in order to support the weak nations in the area. The Barents regional cooperation must naturally incorporate larger parts of Europe. The awareness building is crucial now that the traditional military threat has disappeared. It may not be apparent what security concerns arise from living next to a very unstable and unpredictable still major military power. Particularly when the very same power has made public claims that include your country in its sphere of interest. The nations concerned need both political and economic support from Europe and the US if this is to be achieved to the benefit of the region and Europe as a whole.

NATO has a crucial role to play in this as no other body is able to or has the power to take its place in underwriting the political and military security requirements of Northern Europe. NATO is not irrelevant as some critics claim.⁵⁹ NATO commitments, especially US forces should not be withdrawn from the area. The perception of a reduced threat combined with economic reasons could for instance show that it would be beneficial for the US if the prestocked materiel for the “Norwegian Air Landed MEB” (NALMEB) is

⁵⁹Irvin Kristol. Who Now Cares About NATO, the Wall Street Journal, February 6, 1995, p12.

withdrawn from Norway. I think this would be wrong on two accounts. Firstly, the potential military threats to the Northern area remain significant despite the end of the Cold War as little changes in force composition on the Kola has occurred. This may be countered by claims that the Russian Army represents no threat in its current state of disarray.⁶⁰ Secondly this would be a very strong political signal. Norway not becoming a member of the European Union, puts more emphasis on the Trans-Atlantic connections than ever.

NATO expansion is not a critical part of security in Northern Europe. The door must, however, be open for countries that wish to join - typically the "Visegrad four," namely Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. The Baltic Republics, Sweden, and Finland are also part of this equation. An eventual expansion of NATO eastward must happen in a way that does not ruin the progress that has been made vis a vis Russia. There appears to be a feeling that the process is progressing too fast and in a reckless manner threatening the PFP process. As mentioned earlier, there are threats of ultra nationalists taking power in Russia. These allegations are repeated at intervals and must not allow Russia to obtain a de facto veto over independent nations' actions. There is no doubt that Russia also has to make some concessions. There are also sources indicating that Russia does not look upon NATO expansion with the great fear that is portrayed by some.⁶¹ As mentioned earlier the small and non threatening nations of Northern Europe have a unique role as consensus builders and will be very important bridging the gap between a worried Russia and a West that faces the dilemma of answering calls from Eastern Europe without setting off an uncontrollable situation in Russia.

⁶⁰John Omicinski. "Mighty" Red Army Unmasked, USA Today, February 6, 1995, p11.

⁶¹Martin Sieff. NATO Growth Could Aid Russian Ultra nationalists, the Washington Times, February 7, 1995, p1.

If NATO is expanded to include Finland and Sweden, the legitimate Russian concerns of protecting the critical northwestern area must be recognized. These concerns do not imply that the Cold War continues, but rather that any nation has certain areas of critical importance. Any attempt to minimize the importance of the area or ignore Russia will probably be detrimental to developing a good working relationship with Russia. It will be a major task to explain that expansion of NATO is not directed against Russia or any other country.

There are many positive elements in the developments in Europe today. However, the many different bodies involved create a fragmentation of the efforts and an appearance of competing agendas. This is not unexpected as there are different memberships in these bodies. NATO is best positioned and must take the lead to gather all these positive elements in a fashion that will benefit the efforts to deal with the potential dangers that threaten the post Cold War Europe. For the situation in Northern Europe, the Nordic Countries have a special role to play in pushing forward the cooperation in the Barents region on one side, and on the other side take on a leadership role in creating closer ties with the Baltic republics and Poland. Undoubtedly, this process will be difficult and slow. There is a requirement for political, economic, and military backing from NATO and the entire EU/WEU to underwrite these efforts. NATO must be the balancing force in the process as none of the countries of Northern Europe alone or as part of the region as a whole, can counterbalance the weight of Russia.

V — CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Conclusion

The security issues in Northern Europe vary from the Nordic countries to Poland and the Baltic republics. The remaining Russian military threats are recognized in the Nordic countries. But other threats, especially radioactive pollution from nuclear waste or a nuclear accident, are more prominent than military questions in the current discussions in the region. Building awareness of the situation in the region is an important requirement since the region is not normally focused upon. The goals of the nations in the region are fairly common and put heavy emphasis on inter national cooperation to deal with security issues in a peaceful manner. Finland and Sweden are not likely to change their neutrality after they became members of the EU. They are, however, determined to pursue their goals through an active participation in all appropriate bodies. Norway is in a different situation following the rejection of membership of the EU. The Trans-Atlantic ties have always been considered very important, but in the present situation it has gained an even higher importance demanding high level political visibility. Norway intends, like her Nordic neighbors, to be an active part of the transformation of Europe.

The Baltic republics and Poland feel their positions exposed as Russian officials claim they all are part of a Russian sphere of interest. The security vacuum in the region needs to be filled, and it is obvious that these nations do not want a reasserted Russia, governed by extremists, to fill this void. The countries are impatient as they try to fill the general requirements for NATO membership outlined in the PFP process. In their own mind they are well along the path of establishing democratic governments and institutions. Other requirements like market economies are also gradually being adhered to.

The cooperation efforts in the Barents region and the potential for the Nordic countries to bridge the gap between East and West should be exploited. At the same time the Nordic countries should take on the leadership role in creating closer ties with the Baltic republics and Poland. Undoubtedly, this process will be difficult and slow. There is a requirement for political, economic, and military backing from NATO and the entire EU/WEU to underwrite these efforts. There must be a balancing force in the process as none of the countries of Northern Europe alone or as part of the region as a whole, can counterbalance the weight of Russia.

As I also have shown above there are several organizations and initiatives underway to deal with the post Cold War situation in Europe. Eastern Europe, Russia, and the republics of the former Soviet Union are of a particular concern due to the fragility of their new democratic societies. The underlying potential for new deep rifts can lead to war or civil war. The nuclear question is being addressed leaving only Russia as a nuclear power in this region.

The efforts to establish a new European order has just begun and there are no clear indications of which international body will succeed in leading the way. Several parallel initiatives are competing. The US and the countries of Europe put different emphasis on different organizations in different situations. They all contain very desirable elements especially in the field of consultation and exchange of ideas and values. Few specifics on which to build the future seem to be available. The limitations of the organizations can be summarized to be:

- * The EU/ WEU is not close to reaching any capability to be the leading security policy body or military force in Europe or Northern Europe. The

potential exists for the countries of this organization to bear a heavier defense burden once additional inevitable US reductions occur.

- * The NACC remains a consultative body without any real power or capability to shape the future of Northern Europe.
- * The PFP is in its infancy and it remains to be seen if this will move forward and become a real player. It is now an interim solution awaiting the procedures for future expansion of NATO.
- * The OSCE did not succeed at the Budapest summit in moving forward from being an unwieldy and powerless Cold War organization. It appears that it will be a considerable time before it can resolve regional conflicts or stop them from happening in the first place. A mini-UN without any of the powers and tools of the UN is an unfeasible option for security in Northern Europe.

Although it may appear that NATO is fumbling in search of its new purpose, its political and military structures remain strong despite claims to the contrary. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the accompanying strong rhetoric does not change this fact. NATO is not the only one responsible for not realizing that a new world order did not appear as a result of the Gulf War. The world society through the UN has proven to be just as bewildered. NATO is in place and can most readily be adapted to deal with the changed situation. Simultaneously it can continue to provide the member nations with the security they need. NATO is, based on my research, by far the most ready and able to take on the post Cold War situation in Northern Europe and in Europe as a whole.

The world and Europe are still looking to the US for leadership. Europe does not have the ability — perhaps even the will — to take charge of the situation. The US is an indispensable part of this and is forced to take the lead in adapting NATO to confront the issues in Europe. This will not be the Cold War NATO or present day NATO. It has to be an adapted and expanded organization encompassing the best ideas and functions from all the various parallel activities we witness today. Europe, without America and without a committed American leadership, is a very dangerous place. If that ever happened, I seriously fear for the reappearance of conflicts in the midst of Europe and even a form of "Cold Peace" as threatened by president Boris Yeltsin.

Recommendations

In the current situation the Northern European countries must be prepared to lead the way in finding the appropriate solutions and tools to fill their security needs. In recognition of the fact that some of the countries of the region have a more favorable starting point than others, I recommend the following actions:

- * The Nordic countries with membership both in NATO and the EU have to actively work to build the awareness of the region's situation and what challenges are facing the countries in their search for security and prosperity.
- * The countries of the region have to be realistic and take charge of their own situation. The Nordic countries should take the initiative to establish a

cooperative body with Poland and the Baltic republics that is tasked to develop specific vehicles for political, economic, and military cooperation.

- * The Nordic countries should take the lead in the cooperation efforts with Russia in the Barents region. Building an awareness of the region is necessary both in NATO and the EU. Economic and political support have to be solicited from the EU as well as NATO. NATO support should emphasize US and Canadian participation.
- * Norway should use her influence in an effort to maintain NATO's support to the region. NATO is the organization best suited to guarantee the security of the region in spite of the multitude of players on the European scene. Norway should strive for continued US leadership in NATO and commitments in the region.
- * All Northern European countries should actively participate in the various organizations and initiatives like the OSCE, NACC, and PFP. These are small, non-threatening countries that are in a favorable position to promote confidence and cooperation between other countries.
- * Expansion of NATO is not urgent, but it should be supported as part of a gradual and evolving process.

Appendix — Membership in Multinational Institutions. Source: Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1994.

Legend:

- = member
- = associate member
- = associate partner
- = observer

	C S C E	N A C C	P F P	N A T O	E U	W E U	C I S
United States							
Canada							
Belgium							
France							
Germany							
Italy							
Luxembourg							
Netherlands							
Portugal							
Spain							
United Kingdom							
Greece							
Denmark							
Iceland							
Norway							
Turkey							
Ireland							
Austria							
Finland							
Sweden							
Switzerland							
Czech Republic					1		
Hungary					1		
Poland					1		
Slovakia					1		

Bulgaria					1		
Romania					1		
Albania							
Estonia							
Latvia							
Lithuania							
Russia					2		
Ukraine					2		
Moldova					2		
Azerbaijan							
Georgia							
Kazakhstan							
Turkmenistan							
Armenia							
Belarus							
Kyrgyzstan							
Tajikistan							
Uzbekistan							
Bosnia-Herzegovina							
Croatia							
Macedonia							
Slovenia							
Yugoslavia							
Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Marino							

1. The East European countries minus Albania and the Baltic Republics have signed an associate agreement.
2. Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova have signed partnership and cooperation agreement.

Bibliography (In Order of Reference) :

USA Today, February 6, 1995.
Foreign Affairs, September/October 1993.
European Security, Vol 2, No 4 (Winter 1993).
Time Magazine, July 11, 1994.
Time Magazine, November 21, 1994.
The Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1995.
Arbeiderbladet, Oslo, Norway, January 27, 1995.
Aftenposten, Oslo, Norway, January 27, 1995.
The Los Angeles Times, January 26, 1995.
The New York Times, September 25, 1994.
The Washington Post, September 27, 1994.
NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol 39, No 2, 1994.
The Washington Times, February 6, 1995.
US News and World Report, January 17, 1994.
US Department of State Dispatch, December 13, 1993.
London Financial Times, January 24, 1995.
NATO Review, June 1994.
Fact Sheet in US Department of State Dispatch, June 29, 1992.
The Economist, April 7, 1990.
NATO Review, August 1994.
The New York Times, December 6, 1994.
Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1994.
International Affairs, Vol 70, No I.
Forsvarets Forum, Oslo, Norway, October 5, 1994.
The New York Times, February 12, 1995.
Forbes Magazine, July 4, 1994.
Time Magazine, November 28, 1994.
The New York Times, February 10, 1995.
The New York Times, February 3, 1995.
The Wall Street Journal, February 6, 1995.
USA Today, February 6, 1995.
The Washington Times, February 7, 1995.